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Soft law instruments in restructuring and
insolvency law: exploring its rise and
impact
Soft law instruments are increasingly prevalent in the area
of procedural and substantive restructuring and insolvency
law. These instruments, all embodied in legally non-binding
texts, originate from so-called standard-setting organisa-
tions, such as the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Working Group V (Insolvency)
and the World Bank, as well as mainly insolvency practi-
tioners’ organisations, such as INSOL International and
INSOL Europe. Ambiguity of what they are and how they
impact hard law has blurred the actual role that these soft law instruments have. This raises
questions of how soft law instruments can be (legally) characterized, what advantages and disad-
vantages they have (compared to hard law), and how legislators and policy makers in the field of
restructuring and insolvency make use of them.
1. Introduction
The vague nature of soft law instruments is a general
impediment to practitioners and scholars in considering
its relevance. Still, in recent years, legislators and policy
makers have given particular attention to such instru-
ments, especially in the area of restructuring and insolven-
cy. In both the European Insolvency Regulation Recast
(EIR 2015) and the proposal for a Preventive Restructur-
ing Directive, the EU legislator makes explicit reference
to soft law instruments. Also, the Dutch Vereniging in-
solventierecht advocaten (INSOLAD) and the Dutch
national consultative body of supervisory judges in
bankruptcy and suspension of payment cases (Recofa)
have set soft law standards for practice.
To highlight the rise and impact of soft law instruments,
we will explore the meaning and development of soft law
instruments in restructuring and insolvency law. From
this analysis we observe that soft law instruments are
relevant, in practice, as they are used for example by in-
solvency practitioners, policy makers and courts. The
growing group of standard-setting organisations focuses
on specific topics, for convergence of law and practice,
including cooperation and communication by judges and
insolvency practitioners in cross-border insolvency cases,
as well as issues pertaining to (preventive) restructuring
of distressed companies.
This article is structured as follows: in section two we
will introduce the concepts of soft law and standard-set-
ting organisation, in section three this will be related to
the field of international restructuring and insolvency
law by elaborating on instruments in this area, which is
elaborated in section four with an overview of the relevant
instruments on cooperation and communication and on
restructuring distressed businesses. In section five we
discuss various advantages and disadvantages of the use
of soft law instruments. Subsequently, in section six, we
discuss several examples in order to review the impact
that soft law instruments in restructuring and insolvency
have. This is followed by a conclusion in section seven.
2. Standard-setting organisations in insolvency and
restructuring
The development of soft law instruments is apparent in
various areas of law, including that of international insol-
vency law. These texts1 are commonly referred to as ‘soft
law’ instruments. In this article we first describe what
soft law instruments and standard-setting organisations
are and, secondly, who drafts such texts in the field of
restructuring and insolvency.
2.1. Defining soft law instruments
Often, soft and hard law instruments are distinguished
according to whether or not an instrument is (in the strict
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legal sense) binding.2 Hard law is typically thought of as
conventions, treaties and domestic laws.3 Consensus on
the meaning of soft law instruments4 is lacking.5
In the international literature Abbott and Snidal propose,
for international relations, that hard and soft law are
concepts on a continuum with hard law at one end and
political arrangements at the other end.6 Depending on
certain traits, an instrument will be considered hard law.
This would require the instrument to (i) refer to binding
obligations, (ii) provide precise obligations, and (iii) del-
egate authority for interpreting and implementing the
instrument. Here, soft law is the residual category that
‘(…) begins once legal arrangements are weakened along
one or more of the dimensions of obligation, precision and
delegation.’7
To explore the role and influence of soft law instruments,
we follow, as a working definition in this article, the
previous approach that extends the perception of soft law
beyond being merely non-binding.8 It expands the under-
standing of soft law and highlights the multi-layered di-
mensions of soft law instruments and provides different
angles for reviewing what the role and impact of these
instruments may be.
2.2. Drafting soft law instruments
Soft law instruments are developed by so-called standard-
setting organisations.9 They are also referred to as ‘formu-
lating agencies’ and are described as organisations with
a good reputation and known for their expertise and/or
experience. They create soft law instruments with the
(direct) involvement of members of a certain sector or
field (this may include individuals but also representative
organisations) by means of mutual discussion and agree-
ment. Usually, the outcome of their work has no general
(legal) binding effect.10
Two specific sub-groups of standard-setting organisations
can be distinguished. First, we refer to international
intergovernmental standard-setting organisations.11 They
are described as ‘(…) institutions that create international
[soft law] instruments through deliberation, negotiation,
and ultimately voting’.12 States are usually the main
members or participants of these organisations. They are
organised and operate in ways that approximate features
of domestic legislative institutions, including dividing the
work into committees, setting agendas and grant agenda-
setting powers to key actors, but also, applying specific
voting rules for adoption of soft law instruments.13
Second, and at the other end of the spectrum, are, what
we refer to as, informal standard-setters. The soft law
instruments that they develop are not the result of a
formal structure or process. This especially concerns
gatherings of (insolvency) practitioners, academics and/or
judges, assembling best practices. With the general
agreement of all parties involved the informal standard-
setters can publish their results. They are of a more ad-
hoc nature and aim to resolve particular matters. Al-
though these (groups of) individuals may formally not
qualify as a standard-setting organisation, they are drivers
of soft law instruments.
See for instance the different perspectives of legal positivists, rationalists and constructivists as presented in Gregory C. Shaffer and Mark
A. Pollack, ‘Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance’, 94 Minnesota Law Review
2010, p. 712ff; Bryan H. Druzin, ‘Why does Soft Law Have any Power Anyway?’, in: 7 Asian Journal of International Law 2017, p. 361.
2.
In the area of restructuring and insolvency law, they are considered to have shown disappointing results, see Bob Wessels, International
Insolvency Law, Part I Global Perspectives on Cross-Border Insolvency Law, Deventer: Wolters Kluwer 2015/10089.
3.
In this paper instruments are defined as those texts in which norms and/or standard are included. See also: Dinah Shelton, ‘Introduction:
Law, Non-Law and the Problem of “Soft Law”’, in: Dinah Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms
in the International Legal System, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 5.
4.
See for instance Gregory C. Shaffer and Mark A. Pollack, ‘Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International
Governance’, 94 Minnesota Law Review 2010, p. 706-707 and 712ff. For a more extensive review of international soft law, see Andrew
5.
T. Guzman & Timothy Meyer, ‘Soft Law’, in: Eugene Kontorovich & Francesco Parisi (eds.), Economic Analysis of International Law,
Cheltenham: Elgar Publishing 2016, p. 123-154 (also available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2437956).
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’, 54 International Organization 3, 2000, p. 422.6.
See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’, 54 International Organization 3, 2000,
p. 421-422; Gregory C. Shaffer and Mark A. Pollack, ‘Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International
Governance’, 94 Minnesota Law Review 2010, p. 714.
7.
Shaffer and Pollack argue that both the binary perspective and the continuum perspective are right. Ex post, in an enforcement and litigation
context, a binary perspective is valid, however, in an ex ante situation they argue that during negotiations the continuum perspective fits
8.
better, see Gregory C. Shaffer and Mark A. Pollack, ‘Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International
Governance’, 94 Minnesota Law Review 2010, p. 715-716.
By some this terminology is applied, in particular, to those organisations that develop industry standards for interoperability, performance
or technical standards. See e.g. Practical Law Glossary, Thomson Reuters (available at: https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/9-557-
9.
1858). We take a broader approach in defining standard-setting organisations, irrespective of the content of a soft law instrument, a
‘standard’ refers more generally to efforts made by the involved actors with the aim of (international) standardisation and approximation
by drafting soft law instruments.
See, for instance, Bob Wessels, International Insolvency Law, Part I Global Perspectives on Cross-Border Insolvency Law, Deventer:
Wolters Kluwer 2015/10003 and 10090.
10.
The authors note that the term ‘international legislative institutions’, as introduced by Guzman and Meyer, seems a contradictio in terminis.
Since these so-called international legislative institutions produce non-binding instruments the authors suggest referring to this as: ‘inter-
national intergovernmental standard-setting organisations’.
11.
Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy Meyer, ‘Soft Law’, in: Eugene Kontorovich & Francesco Parisi (eds.), Economic Analysis of International
Law, Cheltenham: Elgar Publishing 2016, p. 140ff (also available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2437956).
12.
Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy Meyer, ‘Soft Law’, in: Eugene Kontorovich & Francesco Parisi (eds.), Economic Analysis of International
Law, Cheltenham: Elgar Publishing 2016, p. 140ff (also available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2437956).
13.
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3. Standard-setting organisations in the field of
restructuring and insolvency
There is an increasing body of soft law instruments and
more active standard-setting organisations on restructur-
ing and insolvency law. We limit ourselves in this part to
the most significant standard-setting organisations. We
will discuss and focus on: (i) international intergovern-
mental standard-setting organisations, (ii) other interna-
tional standard-setting organisations, (iii) other regional
standard-setting organisations, (iv) Dutch standard-set-
ting organisations, and (v) informal standard-setters.
(i) International intergovernmental standard-setting orga-
nisations
Important international intergovernmental standard-set-
ting organisations include the United Nations Committee
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and the
World Bank.14
UNCITRAL15 aims to provide the United Nations with
a more active role in reducing differences between nation-
al legal systems in the area of international trade. Insol-
vency law is dealt with predominantly in UNCITRAL
Working Group V. The work of this group, comprised
of states and non-state observers, has resulted in various
soft law instruments.16 Most significant are the Model
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997, with a Guide to
Enactment of the same year, which developed into a
Guide to Enactment and Interpretation published in 2013)
(‘Model Law’) and the Legislative Guide on Insolvency
Law (parts one and two in 2004, part three in 2010, and
part four in 2013) (‘Legislative Guide’).
The Model Law is designed to assist states in equipping
national insolvency laws with a harmonised and fair
framework for cross-border insolvency cases.17 The
Model Law is limited mainly to procedural aspects of
cross-border insolvency cases. It is intended to operate
as an integral part of the existing insolvency law in an
enacting State, and deals with matters of (i) recognition
of foreign insolvency proceedings, (ii) relief, (iii) access
for a foreign representative, and (v) cooperation and
communication among courts and foreign representatives.
To date, the Model Law has been adopted by nearly 50
jurisdictions across the globe, from all continents.18
The Legislative Guide developed in three waves, starting
in 2004 with a framework for substantive insolvency laws
(parts one and two). Provisions on the treatment of enter-
prise groups in insolvency (part three) and directors’
obligations in the period approaching insolvency (part
four) were added in 2010 and 2013.19 The Legislative
Guide aims to assist the establishment of efficient and
effective legal frameworks to address the financial diffi-
culty of debtors. It is also intended to be used by national
authorities and legislative bodies as a reference when
preparing new laws and regulations or reviewing the ad-
equacy of existing laws and regulations.20
The Netherlands, although represented at these meetings
of UNCITRAL, has not adopted soft law instruments
from UNCITRAL. However, in 2018 the Minister for
Legal Protection announced the setting up of a working
group of representatives from practice to review the
Dutch legislation on international (non-EU) insolvencies.
The minister acknowledges that also in legal doctrine re-
form of legislation in this regard has been suggested. The
soft law instruments of, for instance, UNCITRAL will
provide a relevant perspective in reviewing current Dutch
international insolvency law.21
The World Bank Group22 is another international inter-
governmental standard-setting organisation. It is one of
the world’s largest sources of funding and knowledge for
developing countries. The World Bank has, since the end
of the 90s, continued working on (revisions of) a set of
principles for sound insolvency systems and for
strengthening related debtor-creditor rights in emerging
markets. This resulted, since 2001, in several revised ver-
sions of the Principles for Effective Insolvency and
Other international intergovernmental standard-setting organisations also include: UNIDROIT (in 2013 it published the Principles on
the Operation of Close-Out Netting Provisions); G22 (in 1988 it published the Key Principles and Features of Effective Insolvency Regimes).
14.
See www.uncitral.org.15.
Besides the instruments discussed in this paragraph, other instruments of UNCITRAL include, for example, the Practice Guide on Cross-
Border Insolvency Law (2009), which provides, in particular, guidance on the development of (cross-border) insolvency protocols, (in-
16.
formal) agreements among insolvency practitioners (and courts) on matters pertaining to cooperation and communication in insolvency
proceedings. In 2018 the draft Model Law on Insolvency-Related Judgements was finished. This instrument is expected to be adopted by
UNCITRAL in 2019.
For a more extensive introduction, see e.g. Bob Wessels, International Insolvency Law, Part I Global Perspectives on Cross-Border Insol-
vency Law, Deventer: Kluwer, 2015, par. 10181b-10388.
17.
These includes: Eritrea (2000), Japan (2000), Mexico (2000), South Africa (2000), Montenegro (2002), Romania (2002), Poland (2003),
Serbia (2004), British Virgin Islands, overseas territory of the United Kingdom of Great-Britain and Northern Ireland (2003), Canada
18.
(2005), United States of America (2005), Colombia (2006), Great-Britain (England, Wales and Scotland; 2006), New Zealand (2006), Re-
public of Korea (2006), Slovenia (2007), Australia (2008), Mauritius (2009), Greece (2010), Uganda (2011), Chile (2013), Seychelles (2013),
Vanuatu (2013), Gibraltar (2014), Benin (2015), Burkina Faso (2015), Cameroon (2015), Central African Republic (2015), Chad (2015),
Comoros (2015), Congo (2015), Côte d’Ivoire (2015), Democratic Republic of the Congo (2015), Dominican Republic (2015), Equatorial
Guinea (2015), Gabon (2015), Guinea (2015), Guinea-Bissau (2015), Kenya (2015), Malawi (2015), Mali (2015), Niger (2015), Senegal
(2015), Togo (2015), Singapore (2017), and Israel (2018).
For a more extensive analysis see e.g. Bob Wessels, International Insolvency Law, Part I Global Perspectives on Cross-Border Insolvency
Law, Deventer: Wolters Kluwer 2015/10389-10425kc.
19.
Legislative Guide, Chapter I, paragraph 3.20.
Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2017/18, 3198, p. 1-2.21.
See www.worldbank.org.22.
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Creditor Rights Systems (World Bank Principles),23 the
latest version being published in 2016.
(ii) Other international standard-setting organisations
In the field of restructuring and insolvency, the organisa-
tions mainly consist of practitioners, judges and academ-
ics.24 INSOL International’s25 aim is to compare aspects
of national insolvency law between countries, the mutual
exchange of information and experience and the building
of networks between professional individuals. One of
INSOL International’s more recent initiatives is the re-
vised Statement of Principles for a Global Approach to
Multi-Creditor Workouts II (Statement), published in
2017. It is a set of principles to promote informal restruc-
turing. The Statement comprises eight principles indicat-
ing ‘best practices’ for a company experiencing financial
difficulties which also has a large number of (foreign)
creditors. The Principles are jurisdiction neutral.
Another international standard-setting organisation is
the International Insolvency Institute (III).26 The III aims
to promote and advance international insolvency law,
and in particular, to support better cooperation in cross-
border insolvency cases. An III Committee on Interna-
tional Jurisdiction and Cooperation drafted Guidelines
for Coordination of Multinational Enterprise Groups
that were presented in 2013. Whereas, in general, emphas-
is has been on liquidating rather than restructuring finan-
cially overcommitted businesses and single entities rather
than enterprise groups, these Guidelines address and in-
corporate liquidation and restructuring of enterprise
groups.27
(iii) Other regional standard-setting organisations
For other regional standard-setting organisations we will
introduce two organisations active in the European con-
text, INSOL Europe and the European Law Institute
(ELI).28
INSOL Europe29 is a European organisation of profes-
sionals who specialise in insolvency, business reconstruc-
tion and recovery. In 2014 it instigated the development
of a (draft) Statement of Principles and Guidelines for
Insolvency Office Holders in Europe (INSOL Europe
IOH Principles). It sets professional standards for insol-
vency office holders. Also, in 2015, INSOL Europe
presented the Turnaround Wing Guidelines for Restruc-
turing and Turnaround Professionals.30 This instrument
provides guidance for the professional conduct of profes-
sionals active in the field of (informal) restructuring.
The ELI31 aims to improve the quality of European law,
understood in the broadest sense. It seeks to initiate,
conduct and facilitate research, to make recommenda-
tions, and to provide practical guidance in the field of
European legal development. In summer 2013, the ELI
adopted a project on the Rescue of Business in Insolvency
Law, led by prof. em. Bob Wessels and prof. Stephan
Madaus. This EU wide study resulted in 2017 in a unan-
imously adopted Instrument on Rescue of Business in
Insolvency Law, with some 115 recommendations to
further business rescue laws in Europe.32
(iv) Dutch standard-setting organisations
Two prominent standard-setting organisations in The
Netherlands are the Vereniging insolventierecht advocaten
(INSOLAD) and the national consultative body of super-
visory judges in bankruptcy and suspension of payment
cases (Recofa).
INSOLAD focuses on all matters regarding bankruptcy
and restructuring. Its members are lawyers who have
taken an oath at the Bar (‘advocaten’) with at least seven
years of practical experience, with a minimum of three
years in insolvency law. INSOLAD has developed the
INSOLAD (best) practice rules (praktijkregels) which
provide guidance for insolvency practitioners.33 The IN-
SOLAD practice rules set (minimum) standards for the
conduct of insolvency practitioners, in particular, for
These principles were (partially) revised in 2005, 2011 and 2015 (and published in 2016).23.
Another example would be the International Association of Insolvency Regulators (IAIR). This association comprises policy makers and




The III also supported various other projects, some in cooperation with the American Law Institute. This has resulted in the Principles
of Cooperation among the NAFTA Countries (ALI NAFTA Principles) in 2003 and in 2012 the Global Principles for Cooperation in
27.
International Insolvency Cases and Guidelines. Furthermore, III supported the 2014 EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Co-
operation Principles and endorsed in 2014 the Asia-Pacific Informal Workout Guidelines for Promoting Corporate Restructuring in the
Region of the Asian Bankers Association.
In recent years several regional standard-setting organisations have become actively involved in restructuring and insolvency and have
developed soft law instruments. These include, besides INSOL Europe and ELI, the American Law Institute (ALI), Asian Bankers Asso-
28.
ciation (ABA), Asian Business Law Institute, Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Conference of European Restructuring and Insolvency
Law (CERIL), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the Nordic-Baltic Insolvency Network.
See http://insol-europe.org.29.




The Instrument is available here: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3032309. In 2019 the Instrument and the inventory
reports will be published in: European Law Institute, Rescue of Business in Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press (forthcoming). An
inventory report on the Netherlands was prepared by prof. Reinout Vriesendorp and Rick van Dommelen.
32.
Although the INSOLAD practice rules focus on the liquidator, they can also guide joint administrators where their roles do not differ
significantly from that of the liquidator.
33.
TvOB 2019-256
Soft law instruments in restructuring and insolvency law: exploring its rise and impact
those matters that are not covered by law or case law.
Although the INSOLAD practice rules state they are of
a non-binding nature,34 the INSOLAD review committee
may consider a complaint from a third party against a
member based on a violation of the INSOLAD practice
rules.35 It should be noticed that the practice rules are
designed as an internal instrument that applies to a limited
group of lawyers, who are a member of INSOLAD
However, the practice rules aim to fill the gaps where
neither the law nor case law provide adequate guidance.36
Recofa37 has developed sets of guidelines that supervisory
judges apply with respect to bankruptcy, suspension of
payment and personal debt discharge.38 These guidelines
aim to standardise procedural policies among insolvency
courts in The Netherlands. The guidelines for bankruptcy
and suspension of payment proceedings were last revised
as of 1 January 2019. In addition, Recofa developed in
2013 a set of principles on the appointment of insolvency
practitioners in bankruptcy and suspension of payment
proceedings.
(v) Informal standard-setters
Informal standard-setters have brought forward various
instruments. Consider, for instance, the ad-hoc Interna-
tional Working Group on European Insolvency Law that
published the Principles of European Insolvency Law in
2003. This set of principles is developed to provide gui-
dance for more convergence of substantive insolvency
laws. It provides for the essence of European insolvency
proceedings.39 Another example is the European Com-
munication and Cooperation Guidelines for Cross-Bor-
der Insolvency (CoCo Guidelines) (2007), which were
drafted by professors Bob Wessels and Miguel Virgós.
The CoCo Guidelines provide guidance to insolvency
practitioners with regard to their duties under Article 31
of the European Insolvency Regulation 2000 (EIR 2000)40
to cooperate and communicate.41 Furthermore, in 2014
the EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Co-
operation Principles (EU JudgeCo Principles and
Guidelines) were published. They were developed by
professor Bob Wessels and dr. Paul Omar and deal with
matters of cooperation and communication by judges in
cross-border insolvency cases. More recently, a project
was conducted by a consortium of universities under the
leadership of professor Lorenzo Stanghellini: ‘The Con-
tractualised distress resolution in the shadow of the law:
Effective judicial review and oversight of insolvency and
pre-insolvency proceedings’ (CoDiRe). The resulting
report of 2018 provides recommendations for (pre-)insol-
vency proceedings.42
The foregoing provides an overview of the growing realm
and great variety of standard-setting organisations in re-
structuring and insolvency. Until recently, the develop-
ment of soft law instruments in the field of restructuring
and insolvency law had been driven by UNCITRAL and
the World Bank. They have set important global stand-
ards for both procedural and substantive restructuring
and insolvency. Currently, more regional and standard-
setting organisations are active; they are not intergovern-
mental organisations, rather groups driven by more (in-
formal) communities of practitioners, judges, academics.
4. The rise of soft law instruments on restructuring
and insolvency
In this section we elaborate on how soft law instruments
are present in the area of international restructuring and
insolvency law. We provide an overview of the globally
most prominent instruments for two topics. These two
topics are current and have received much consideration
by standard-setting organisations, they are: (i) coopera-
tion and communication in cross-border insolvency cases,
and (ii) restructuring of distressed businesses.
4.1. Cooperation and communication in cross-border
insolvency cases
The difficulties in cross-border insolvency cases have
driven the need for further cooperation and communica-
tion by and between courts and insolvency practitioners.43
This has been developed and expanded in subsequent soft
law instruments over the past decades, including:
– International Bar Association, Model International
Insolvency Cooperation Act (1989)
– International Bar Association, Cross-Border Insol-
vency Concordat (1995);
INSOLAD praktijkregels 2011, voorwoord, available at: https://www.insolad.nl/regelgeving/praktijkregels/.34.
See INSOLAD Toetsingsregelement of 15 September 2015, Article 2(1)(2), available at: http://static.basenet.nl/cms/105928/website/35.
Toetsingsreglement.pdf.
INSOLAD praktijkregels 2011, voorwoord, available at: https://www.insolad.nl/regelgeving/praktijkregels/.36.
See for more information on Recofa: https://www.rechtspraak.nl/Voor-advocaten-en-juristen/Reglementen-procedures-en-formulier-
en/Civiel/Insolventierecht/Paginas/Recofa-richtlijnen.aspx. Other instruments and forms are also available here, such as the Separatisten-
regeling (arrangement regarding secured creditors).
37.
In developing its guidelines, Recofa cooperates with the Dutch Council for the Judiciary, the Council for Legal Aid and INSOLAD.38.
The principles are available here: https://www.iiiglobal.org/sites/default/files/21-_PEILABIjournal_appended.pdf.39.
Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings, OJ L160/1.40.
This was a project under the aegis of INSOL Europe, the text is available here: http://www.bobwessels.nl/site/assets/files/2008/coco-text-
october-2007.pdf. Currently, the Conference of European Restructuring and Insolvency Law (CERIL) and INSOL Europe are working
41.
on a revision of the CoCo Guidelines. See also Reinout Vriesendorp & Paul Omar, ‘Communication and Cooperation: The continuing
challenge’, Eurofenix 2017/18 winter, p. 38-39.
For more information on CoDiRe, see www.codire.eu. The final report is available here: https://www.codire.eu/publications/stanghellini-
mokal-paulus-tirado-best-practices-in-european-restructuring-contractualised-distress-resolution-in-the-shadow-of-the-law-2018-2/.
42.
Elizabeth K. Somers, ‘The Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act: An International Proposal for Domestic Legislation’,
American University International Law Review 6 (4), 1991, p. 677. Consider specifically also cross-border insolvency cases such as Re
43.
Maxwell Communication Corporation plc, [1992] B.C.L.C. 465, and Re Olympia & York Developments Ltd. v. Royal Trust Co (1993),
20 C.B.R. (3d) 165.
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– UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insol-
vency with Guide to Enactment and Interpretation,
1997 (Revised Guide to Enactment and Interpreta-
tion, 2013);
– ALI, Transnational Insolvency: Cooperation among
the NAFTA Countries: Principles of Cooperation
among the NAFTA Countries (2000);
– ALI, Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court
Communications in Cross-Border Cases (2001);
– CoCo Guidelines (2007);
– UNCITRAL Practice Guide on Cross-Border In-
solvency Cooperation (2009);
– ALI and III, Global Principles for Cooperation in
International Insolvency Cases (2012) (Global
Principles (2012));
– UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insol-
vency: The Judicial Perspective (2013);
– EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Co-
operation Principles (2014) (EU JudgeCo Principles
(2014));
– The World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency
and Creditor Rights Systems (2016); and
– Judicial Insolvency Network, Guidelines for Com-
munication and Cooperation Between Courts in
Cross-Border Insolvency Matters (2017) (JIN
Guidelines (2017)).
The early instruments on this topic were developed by
the International Bar Association (IBA). In 1989, it
presented the Model International Insolvency Coopera-
tion Act and a few years later, in 1995, the Cross-Border
Insolvency Concordat. Both are models for incorporation
into national laws.44 They were followed up by the widely
adopted UNCITRAL Model Law, which in Chapter IV
deals with matters of cooperation (and communication)
with foreign courts and foreign representatives.45 Further
details on how courts and insolvency practitioners can
cooperate and communicate in cross-border insolvency
cases were elaborated in multiple soft law instruments.
Currently, the most relevant soft law instruments on
cross-border cooperation and communication would in-
clude:46 (i) the Global Principles (2012), (ii) the EU
JudgeCo Principles (2014), and (iii) the JIN Guidelines
(2017). The overriding objective of the Global Principles
(2012) is to enable ‘(…) courts and insolvency administrat-
ors to operate effectively and efficiently in international
insolvency cases with the goals of maximizing the value
of the debtor’s global assets, preserving where appropriate
the debtors’ business, and furthering the just administra-
tion of the proceeding.’47 Also based on this instrument,
but tailored specifically to the EU context, are the EU
JudgeCo Principles (2014). Furthermore, the JIN
Guidelines (2017) aim to set a global standard for the ju-
diciary, so far adopted by several courts internationally.48
4.2. Restructuring of distressed businesses
Whereas, in general, emphasis has been on liquidating
rather than restructuring financially overcommitted
businesses, various soft law instruments have made recom-
mendations for legislators to improve their restructuring
frameworks. Over time, the instruments have become
more detailed and in some cases have specifically focused
on restructuring. These include:
– Asian Development Bank, Good Practice Standards
for Insolvency Law (2000);
– International Working Group on European Insol-
vency Law, Principles of European Insolvency Law
(2003);
– UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law
(2004, 2010, 2013);
– III, Guidelines for Coordination of Multinational
Enterprise Groups (2013);
– Asian Bankers Association, Asia-Pacific Informal
Workout Guidelines for Promoting Corporate Re-
structuring in the Region and Model Agreement to
Promote Corporate Restructuring: A Model Adapt-
able for Use Regionally, by a Jurisdiction, or for a
Particular Debtor (2013);
– Nordic-Baltic Insolvency Network, Nordic-Baltic
Recommendations on Insolvency Law (2015);
– The World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency
and Creditor Rights Systems (2016)
– INSOL International, Statement of Principles for a
Global Approach to Multi-Creditor Workouts II
(2017);
– ELI, Instrument of the European Law Institute on
the Rescue of Business in Insolvency Law (2017)
(ELI Instrument on Business Rescue (2017)); and
– Contractualised Distress Resolution in the Shadow
of the Law: Effective judicial review and oversight
of insolvency and pre-insolvency proceedings (2018)
(CoDiRe Project (2018)).
For the European context, the ELI Instrument on Busi-
ness Rescue (2017) may be of particular relevance. It
provides for 115 recommendations on ten substantive
topics dealing with businesses in financial distress. It is
addressed to European and national legislators, as well
as European and national professional bodies to improve
existing restructuring frameworks.
The Model on International Insolvency Cooperation Act has not been adopted into national insolvency laws. The Cross-Border Insolvency
Concordat has been adopted in specific cases, but was superseded by the UNCITRAL Model Law, see: Rosalind F. Mason, ‘Cross-Border
Insolvency and Legal Transnationalisation’, 21 International Insolvency Review, 2012, p. 119.
44.
See in particular Articles 25-27 Model Law.45.
Also the UK Chancery Guide of 5 May 2017, par. 25.29 highlights these instruments with respect to cross-border court-to-court cooper-
ation and communication, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chancery-guide.
46.
Global Principle 1.1.47.
These include the US Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, the Supreme Court of Singapore, the US Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York, The Supreme Court of Bermuda, The Chancery Division of England & Wales, the Eastern Caribbean
48.
Supreme Court, The Supreme Court Equity Division of New South Wales, the US Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida,
the Seoul Bankruptcy Court, and the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands. For the overview, see: http://www.jin-global.org/jin-
guidelines.html.
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The foregoing shows that the development of soft law
instruments dealing with matters of restructuring and
insolvency law is being pursued globally.49 This includes
standard-setting organisations active on almost all contin-
ents, although mostly in Europe. We also note that these
standard-setting organisations have been increasingly
productive. This development has also driven the in-
creased pace at which instruments have been published
in recent years. Except for bilateral instruments, there
were some twelve international soft law instruments in
2000; this increased to 28 in 2010, 41 in 2015 and some
55 in 2018, a rise of over 400 percent in less than a decade.
5. Why bother about soft law instruments?
Drafting and using soft law instruments brings various
advantages and disadvantages compared to hard law in-
struments. This helps the understanding of what soft law
instruments are and what role they can play in the area
of restructuring and insolvency.
Soft law instruments and their use have various advan-
tages compared to hard law instruments:
1. More flexibility. Soft law instruments are not bound
in scope, and can extend to topics where political interest
or consensus is lacking. Also, they allow for easy (later)
ad-hoc adjustments (consider the development of the
World Bank Principles),50 and enable tailor-made solu-
tions (consider the implementation of the Model Law of
UNCITRAL).51
2. Drafted and adopted relatively quickly and at lower
cost. The absence of the formalised legislative processes
applicable to hard law allows parties to proceed expedi-
tiously.52 Finalised soft law instruments are directly
available to (non-)state actors.53 In general, it is presumed
to be less costly to negotiate them. However, the pro-
cesses of institutionalised standard-setters in restructuring
and insolvency demonstrate that it may take several years
before consensus is reached. Consider, for instance, the
due process applied by UNCITRAL,54 where it usually
takes several years to draft and adopt an instrument.
3. A less politicised compromise. Particularly in the area
of international insolvency law, soft law instruments are
less politicised than hard law. They are often developed
by standard-setting organisations which are composed
of experts in the field. Soft law instruments can be the
result of stronger participatory governance, as non-state
actors can be involved more easily.55
4. Better coordinated action. The use of soft law instru-
ments resolves coordination deficiencies and problems56
that may arise on those topics where everybody would
benefit from an aligned and coordinated approach. Cross-
border insolvency law is the kind of topic where soft law
instruments are helpful in setting standards – in the ab-
sence of hard law – for example in matters of cross-border
cooperation between courts and insolvency practitioners.
5. No diminishing sovereignty. States and judges do not
lose sovereignty with soft law instruments.57 They may
enable deeper and further cooperation between states,
due also to the limited risks regarding enforceability
(leaving states with a margin of appreciation), reputation,
Compare Bob Wessels, International Insolvency Law, Part I Global Perspectives on Cross-Border Insolvency Law, Deventer: Wolters
Kluwer 2015/10089.
49.
This is in particular reflected in the principles and guidelines in the area of Cooperation and Communication for insolvency practitioners
and courts. See for instance the EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Cooperation Principles (2014), that build further on (and
50.
tailor to the EU setting) the American Law Institute and International Insolvency Institute, Global Principles for Cooperation in Interna-
tional Insolvency Cases (2012), which in turn were built on (and expanded) the American Law Institute, Transnational Insolvency: Co-
operation among the NAFTA Countries: Principles of Cooperation among the NAFTA Countries (2000).
Compare Bob Wessels, International Insolvency Law, Part I Global Perspectives on Cross-Border Insolvency Law, Deventer: Wolters
Kluwer 2015/10089.
51.
Dinah Shelton, ‘Introduction: Law, Non-Law and the Problem of “Soft Law”’, in: Dinah Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance:
The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000, p. 13; Andrew T. Guzman &
52.
Timothy Meyer, ‘Soft Law’, in: Eugene Kontorovich & Francesco Parisi (eds.), Economic Analysis of International Law, Cheltenham:
Elgar Publishing 2016, p. 135 (also available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2437956).
Gregory C. Shaffer and Mark A. Pollack, ‘Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance’,
94 Minnesota Law Review 2010, p. 719; Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy Meyer, ‘Soft Law’, in: Eugene Kontorovich & Francesco Parisi
53.
(eds.), Economic Analysis of International Law, Cheltenham: Elgar Publishing 2016, p. 131-132 (also available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=2437956).
Consider for instance the Model Law (1997), UNCITRAL Legislative Guide (2004, 2010 and 2013), and UNCITRAL Model Law on
Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgements (adoption expected in 2019).
54.
Dinah Shelton, ‘Introduction: Law, Non-Law and the Problem of “Soft Law”’, in: Dinah Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance:
The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 13 and 19. Compare also:
55.
Gert-Jan Boon, ‘Harmonising European Insolvency Law: The Emerging Role of Stakeholders’, International Insolvency Review, 2018/1303,
p. 150-177.
Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy Meyer, ‘Soft Law’, in: Eugene Kontorovich & Francesco Parisi (eds.), Economic Analysis of International
Law, Cheltenham: Elgar Publishing 2016, p. 133-134 (also available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2437956).
56.
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’, 54 International Organization 3, 2000, p. 436;
Louise Verill, ‘The INSOL-Europe Guidelines for Communication and Co-Operation’, in: Bob Wessels and Paul Omar (eds.), Crossing
57.
(Dutch) Borders in Insolvency. Papers from the INSOL Europe Academic Forum and Meijers Institute of the Leiden Law School Joint
Insolvency Conference, Leiden, The Netherlands, 5-6 June 2008, Nottingham, Paris: INSOL Europe 2009, at 43; Gregory C. Shaffer and
Mark A. Pollack, ‘Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance’, 94 Minnesota Law Review
2010, p. 719.
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and providing a precedent.58 Very often, instruments have
a provision allowing courts to deviate from the instru-
ment when it breaches public policy.59
6. Setting ethical and professional standards. Compared
to hard law instruments, soft law instruments can more
easily lay down social ethical norms.60 Legislators have
made use of this, for instance, in Recital 48 of the
European Insolvency Regulation 2015 (EIR 2015),61
which specifically instructs insolvency practitioners and
courts when cooperating under the regulation, to make
use of soft law instruments on communication and co-
operation. Furthermore, the EU proposal for a Preventive
Restructuring Directive makes specific reference to the
sharing of best practices when training practitioners.62
We also note there are, compared to hard law, certain
limitations and disadvantages to drafting and using soft
law instruments in restructuring and insolvency:
1. Constrained findability. There is no central repository
or database for instruments in the area of international
insolvency law.63 Some studies have provided an overview
of developments in this regard.64 However, given the high
pace at which new soft law instruments are developed, it
is complicated to be aware of, especially, new or revised
instruments.65
2. Difficulty of interpretation. A serious problem for in-
terpreting soft law instruments is the diverse, inconsistent,
unspecific66 and sometimes unclear use of language.67
Many instruments use their own terminology, some de-
velop their own definitions and/or glossary,68 but this is
not always the case.69 Also, guides to enactment and/or
commentaries are valuable for interpreting an instrument.
3. Ignoring procedural aspects of revisions. Soft law instru-
ments are often designed as fixed instruments where no
procedure is envisaged for revision. Only rarely are they
embedded in a governance framework for periodic re-
view.70 Without revisions, instruments may risk becoming
out-dated and losing relevance. Revisions frequently de-
pend on the initiative of certain interested or involved
parties.71
4. Non-binding nature. The effectiveness of soft law in-
struments is significantly limited by their non-binding
nature.72 Also, the governance framework of soft law in-
struments is limited: we have found no examples for re-
structuring and insolvency law that clearly state the
consequences for violating the terms of the instrument.73
Furthermore, it may take considerable time before the
impact of soft law instruments becomes apparent.
Therefore, some scholars submit that soft law instruments
are inferior to hard law.74
Gregory C. Shaffer and Mark A. Pollack, ‘Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance’,
94 Minnesota Law Review 2010, p. 719.
58.
See for instance Model Law, Article 6; Global Principles 3(iii), 7 and 15; EU JudgeCo Principle 2; ALI NAFTA Principle 1.59.
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’, 54 International Organization 3, 2000, p. 456.60.
Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency proceedings (recast) (OJ L 141/19,
5 June 2015).
61.
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and
measures to increase the efficiency of restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30 - Confirmation
62.
of the final compromise text with a view to agreement of 17 December 2018, 15556/18, available at: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/doc-
ument/ST-15556-2018-INIT/en/pdf.
Bob Wessels, International Insolvency Law, Part I Global Perspectives on Cross-Border Insolvency Law, Deventer: Wolters Kluwer
2015/10089.
63.
Bob Wessels and Gert-Jan Boon, Cross-Border Insolvency Law: International Instruments and Commentary, second edition, Alphen aan
den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2015.
64.
Compare also Louise Verill, ‘The INSOL-Europe Guidelines for Communication and Co-Operation’, in: Bob Wessels and Paul Omar
(eds.), Crossing (Dutch) Borders in Insolvency. Papers from the INSOL Europe Academic Forum and Meijers Institute of the Leiden Law
School Joint Insolvency Conference, Leiden, The Netherlands, 5-6 June 2008, Nottingham, Paris: INSOL Europe 2009, at 48.
65.
Katharina Pistor, ‘The Standardization of Law and Its Effects on Developing Economies’, 50 American Journal of Comparative Law 2002,
97ff; Bob Wessels, International Insolvency Law, Part I Global Perspectives on Cross-Border Insolvency Law, Deventer: Wolters Kluwer
2015/10089 and 10116.
66.
Bob Wessels, International Insolvency Law, Part I Global Perspectives on Cross-Border Insolvency Law, Deventer: Wolters Kluwer
2015/10089.
67.
See e.g. Model Law with Guide to Enactment and Interpretation (1997, 2013) and the Legislative Guide (2004, 2010, 2013), but also the
Global Principles (2012) and the ELI Instrument on Rescue of Business in Insolvency Law (2017).
68.
See e.g. EBRD Core Principles for an Insolvency Law Regime (2004).69.
An exception may be the World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems, which were introduced in 2001
and revised in 2005, 2011 and 2015. The revisions were ‘[b]ased on the experience gained from the use of the Principles, and following
70.
extensive consultations, the publication has been thoroughly reviewed and updated.’ An exception, outside insolvency, is the Incoterms.
Since 1936 they have been reviewed and adjusted several times, most recently in 2010. See also: https://iccwbo.org/resources-for-busi-
ness/incoterms-rules/incoterms-rules-history.
Consider, for instance, the review of the CoCo Guidelines (2007) by the Conference of European Restructuring and Insolvency Law
(CERIL) and INSOL Europe, which are working on a revision of the CoCo Guidelines.
71.
Bob Wessels, International Insolvency Law, Part I Global Perspectives on Cross-Border Insolvency Law, Deventer: Wolters Kluwer
2015/10089.
72.
One of the strongest statements in this respect is included in the ABA Principles provision on Assigning of debts: ‘Sellers of debts should
ensure that buyers are aware of the Informal Workout Guidelines and that they would be expected to adhere to them.’
73.
Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy Meyer, ‘Soft Law’, in: Eugene Kontorovich & Francesco Parisi (eds.), Economic Analysis of International
Law, Cheltenham: Elgar Publishing 2016, p. 123-124 (also available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2437956).
74.
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5. Lack of due process. Since the process of developing
soft law instruments is not regulated, the standing of
standard-setting organisations and the working methods
they adopt affect the perceived credibility of the instru-
ment(s) they develop. UNCITRAL has set up an exten-
sive set of Rules of Procedure and Methods of Work.75
In other cases, an ad-hoc process is developed.76 Standard-
setting organisations should put particular emphasis on
adopting a process, which may significantly impact the
standing of the instrument.
6. Incompleteness of soft law instruments. First, the issue
of ‘incomplete contracts’ is difficult to resolve for soft
law instruments. They lack a mechanism for interpreta-
tion, which is present for hard law.77 Second, dispute
settlement may be more difficult with soft law instru-
ments. Monitoring of compliance with a soft law instru-
ment is usually not present, just as there are no proce-
dures for resolving conflicts. This is different for hard
law which is embedded in a larger legal framework involv-
ing courts for resolving disputes.78 These aspects of soft
law instruments may lead to higher post-agreement costs
for managing, monitoring and enforcing the commit-
ments.79
The reasons to develop or to use soft law instruments
may be various. The foregoing shows, besides the advan-
tages, several disadvantages in using soft law instruments
in the area of restructuring and insolvency. Since soft law
instruments are developed and used by legislators as well,
we must conclude they are relevant. However, the role
of soft law instruments could be improved. Standard-
setting organisations should focus on using clear language
for ease of interpretation, which can be further benefit
from accompanying glossaries or explanatory guides. The
development of standards for drafting soft law instru-
ments may be helpful in guiding younger and more in-
formal standard-setters. Practice may also benefit from
a better overview of (i) what the important soft law in-
struments are and where to find them, and (ii) hard law
and case law where soft law instruments were involved.
In the next section we will elaborate on the extent to
which soft law instruments have impacted hard law and
case law in the field of restructuring and insolvency.
6. Exploring the impact of restructuring and
insolvency soft law instruments
In the area of international insolvency there is no global
framework and regional frameworks are limited.80 The
alternative, soft law instruments, are of a non-binding
nature. This is sometimes explicitly stated in the instru-
ment itself,81 but this does not imply it has no impact.82
In this part we will discuss the different ways in which
non-binding and non-enforceable soft law instruments
have an impact in the field of restructuring and insolven-
cy.
6.1. Case law
In several cases related to restructuring and insolvency,
courts have explicitly referred to (international) recom-
mendations made by standard-setting organisations.83
Soon after the adoption of the Global Principles (2012),
they were applied by courts. See for instance the Supreme
Court of The United Kingdom, in the Conjoined Appeals
in (1) Rubin & Anor v Eurofinance SA & Ors and (2)
New Cap Reinsurance Corp Ltd & Anor v Grant and
others [2012] UKSC 46 (24), stated that its position was
also based on ‘(…) the modern approach (…) which is
that the jurisdiction with international competence is that
of the country of the centre of main interests of the debtor
(an expression not without its own difficulties) (…)’ and
then referred to the ALI-III Global Principles (2012).
Furthermore, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit (in Re ABC Learning Centres) on 23 Au-
gust 2013 referred to the Global Principle 1, and cited
that ‘(…) the overriding objective [is to] enable courts and
insolvency administrators to operate effectively and effi-
ciently in international insolvency cases with the goals of
maximizing the value of the debtor’s global assets, pre-
serving where appropriate the debtors’ business, and fur-
thering the just administration of the proceeding.’ Another
part of the Global Principles report is cited too: ‘[T]he
emphasis must be on ensuring that the insolvency admin-
istrator, appointed in that proceeding, is accorded every
possible assistance to take control of all assets of the debtor
that are located in other jurisdictions. Id. at cmt. to
Global Principle 24.’ On the Model Law of UNCITRAL
See https://uncitral.un.org/en/about/methods/officialdocs.75.
See for instance: Bob Wessels (ed.), EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Cooperation Principles, Den Haag: Eleven Publishing
2015, p. 12ff.
76.
Gregory C. Shaffer and Mark A. Pollack, ‘Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance’,
94 Minnesota Law Review 2010, p. 718.
77.
Gregory C. Shaffer and Mark A. Pollack, ‘Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance’,
94 Minnesota Law Review 2010, p. 718.
78.
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’, 54 International Organization 3, 2000, p. 434.79.
Consider in Latin America the Montevideo Treaty on International Commercial Law (1889); Havana Convention on Private International
Law (1928; also: Bustamante Code); Montevideo Treaty on International Commercial Terrestrial Law (1940); Montevideo Treaty on In-
80.
ternational Procedural Law (1940), in Europe the EIR 2015 (for the EU member states, excluding Denmark), the Nordic Bankruptcy
Convention 1933 (latest revision of 1982) (for Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden), and for the 17 members of the Organi-
sation pour l’Harmonisation du Droit des Affaire (OHADA) (or: Organisation for the harmonisation of business law), in the central
African region, the Uniform Act on Bankruptcy Proceedings (2015).
See for instance INSOL Europe IOH Principle 1.1.81.
See, for instance, Dinah Shelton, ‘Introduction: Law, Non-Law and the Problem of “Soft Law”’, in: Dinah Shelton (ed.), Commitment
and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000, p. 12.
82.
See also: Bob Wessels, ‘EU Courts Can Rely on Soft Law Principles for Cooperation in International Insolvency Cases’, 6 International
Insolvency Law Review 2015/2, p. 145-160.
83.
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there is also extensive case law. This is collected and made
available in an online database.84
In Dutch case law, references to such international docu-
ments have not been found. However, there are some
examples where the Advocate-General to the Supreme
Court has referred to soft law instruments.85 Dutch soft
law instruments on restructuring and insolvency have
been referred to in insolvency cases. The INSOLAD
practice rules have been used by creditors and debtors in
proceedings against the liquidator.86 In court, the parties
have also relied on instruments from Recofa.87 Further-
more, in disciplinary proceedings against a lawyer acting
as liquidator or joint administrator, the instruments from
INSOLAD and Recofa have also been referred to.88
6.2. Transformation into hard law
Legislators or courts have taken notice of certain sets of
soft law instruments in their policy making. The UK for
instance has in its UK Chancery Guide and in its legisla-
tive initiative on insolvency and governance referred to
soft law instruments.89 Also, in the light of the coopera-
tion and communication duties under the EIR 2015, the
Dutch courts have opened a webpage. Here they elaborate
on cooperation and communication, but also refer to soft
law instruments, such as the EU JudgeCo Principles.90
References by these courts will be welcomed in practice.
They do not, however, as such alter the nature of such
an instrument as being legally non-binding.
Certain standard-setting organisations assist in reviewing
and improving insolvency law frameworks based on soft
law instruments. Consider the World Bank and
UNCITRAL in this regard. The World Bank makes
analysis of national laws by performing so-called ‘Reports
on the Observance of Standards and Codes’, which are
also performed for insolvency regimes based on its Prin-
ciples for effective insolvency and creditor/debtor regimes
(latest version of 2016). These assessments are also used
in assisting countries in the reform of insolvency re-
gimes.91
Also, UNCITRAL provides assistance to those countries
that are in a processing of adopting legislation based on
UNCITRAL instruments.92 As said, the Model Law has
inspired legislation in some 50 jurisdictions. The Model
Law has proven to be of significant use in countries with
‘obsolete’ international insolvency law legislation, for
example, Japan and Mexico, both of which are civil law
(or non-common law) countries. Some countries stayed
very or quite close to the original structure and content
(USA and Great Britain), some excluded certain sections
(Japan, Mexico) and others build in provisions applying
the Model Law on a reciprocal basis, although the nature
of these reciprocity provisions varies (British Virgin Is-
lands, Mexico, Romania and South Africa).93 The EIR
2015 does not deal with cross-border insolvency matters
extending beyond a Member State of the European Union
(except for Denmark) into a non-Member State. Several
of its Member States have adopted the Model Law, includ-
ing Great Britain.
6.3. Extending hard law
Soft law can act as a stepping-stone for the development
of hard law, just as hard law can be elaborated by using
See Case Law on UNCITRAL Texts (CLOUT) providing for 118 cases globally, available at: www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/case_law.html.84.
See for an example: Opinion A-G Huydecoper 28 April 2006, ECLI:NL:PHR:2006:AV0653, at footnote 10, where a reference is made
to the (commentary on the) Principles of European Insolvency Law (2003) of the International Working Group on European Insolvency
85.
Law. In its judgment, the Supreme Court refers explicitly to several paragraphs of the opinion of the Advocate-General, which includes
the aforementioned principles, see HR 28 April 2006, ECLI:NL:HR:2006:AV0653, at 3.4. See furthermore: Opinion A-G Timmerman,
12 April 2013, ECLI:NL:PHR:2013:BY9087, at footnote 7, referring to the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide (2004) and the Principles of
European Insolvency Law (2003) of the International Working Group on European Insolvency Law.
See District Court Overijssel 4 September 2013, ECLI:NL:RBOVE:2013:2291, at 6.6-6.7. The court based its decision also on the obser-
vation that the liquidator – a member of INSOLAD – acted inconsistently with the INSOLAD practice rules. Whereas the District Court
86.
of Amsterdam kept it open whether or not the INSOLAD practice rules were binding or only generally guiding (District Court Amsterdam
24 October 2012, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2012:BY4491, at 4.18-4.19), in 2017 the District Court of Rotterdam stated they are non-binding
but can be guiding (District Court Rotterdam 27 July 2011, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2017:5905, at 5.9). In another case at the first instance
court in Curaçao, the court approved a pre-pack but ordered the provisional liquidator to adhere to the INSOLAD rules for provisional
liquidators, see Court of First Instance 2 February 2017, ECLI:NL:OGEAC:2017:7, at 6.
See e.g. Court of Appeal ’s-Hertogenbosch 30 January 2014, ECLI:NL:GHSHE:2014:386, at 3.4.4; District Court Rotterdam 21 July
2014, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2014:7099, at 2.7; District Court Den Haag 16 October 2017, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2017:12289.
87.
Violation of the INSOLAD practice rules has been brought forward several times in disciplinary proceedings (see e.g. RvD ’s-Hertogenbosch
28 February 2012, ECLI:NL:TADRSHE:2012:YA2614; RvD Rotterdam 9 September 2015, ECLI:NL:TADRSGR:2015:298). The Board
88.
of Discipline decided in 2016 that a liquidator who for practical reasons reached out directly to the (director of the) debtor, was not in
violation of the INSOLAD practice rules (RvD ’s-Gravenhage 12 December 2016, ECLI:NL:TADRSGR:2016:241, at 5.4). For the Recofa
guidelines, see e.g. HvD ’s-Gravenhage 21 June 2010, ECLI:NL:TADRSGR:2010:YA0985, at 5.8; RvD Arnhem 18 March 2013,
ECLI:NL:TADRARN:2013:YA4260, at 5.2 and 5.5.
See for instance: UK Chancery Guide of 5 May 2017, par. 25.30, available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/chancery-guide; UK




The assessments are performed by the World Bank, in collaboration with the IMF and UNCITRAL. See for more information:
www.worldbank.org/en/programs/rosc.
91.
For the technical assistance offered by UNCITRAL, see https://uncitral.un.org/en/TA.92.
See Bob Wessels, ‘Will UNCITRAL bring changes to insolvency proceedings outside the USA and Great-Britain? It certainly will!’, in:
3 International Corporate Rescue 2006, p. 200ff.
93.
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soft law.94 Illustrative is the EIR 2015, which explicitly
refers to soft law instruments in Recital 48, stating: ‘When
cooperating, insolvency practitioners and courts should
take into account best practices for cooperation in cross-
border insolvency cases, as set out in principles and
guidelines on communication and cooperation adopted
by European and international organisations active in the
area of insolvency law, and in particular the relevant
guidelines prepared by the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law (Uncitral).’95 Such ap-
proaches will, generally, lead to a hybrid of both hard
law and soft law instruments.96 Another example is the
proposal for the European Preventive Restructuring Di-
rective which promotes the sharing of best practices in
the training of practitioners.97 Furthermore, case law has
also several times referred to soft law instruments on re-
structuring and insolvency.98
Another example is Australia. In 2008 Australia adopted
the Model Law in its Cross-Border Insolvency Act. In
the years following, this has led to changes in the court
rules in several states and territories. For instance, the
Court Procedures Rules 2006 of the Australian Capital
Territory introduced part 6.15A on proceedings under
the Cross-Border Insolvency Act. In 2017 they were
amended to include an explicit reference to the Global
Principles and the Global Guidelines (2012) of ALI and
III.99 For instance, where a party applies for a form of
cooperation (other than under a coordination agreement),
they are required to state what provisions of the Global
Guidelines would apply.100
7. Conclusions and suggestions for further research
In this article we have discussed the rise and impact of
soft law instruments in the field of restructuring and in-
solvency law. In section two, we adopted as a working
definition of soft law instruments, that it includes those
instruments that – contrary to hard law instruments –
are weakened on one or more of the following dimen-
sions: (i) it provides binding obligations, (ii) it provides
precise obligations, and (iii) it delegates authority for in-
terpreting and implementing the instrument. We observe
that the difference between hard and soft law instruments
extends beyond the common distinction between binding
versus non-binding. We observed that soft law instru-
ments are developed by standard-setting organisations,
which are described as organisations with a good reputa-
tion and known for their expertise and/or experience.
We highlighted two specific types of standard-setting
organisations: (i) those that are composed of govern-
mental members, the so-called international intergovern-
mental standard-setting organisations (for instance UN-
CITRAL and the World Bank), and (ii) those where the
soft law instrument is the result of a more informal
gathering of (insolvency) practitioners, academics or
judges, assembling best practices regarding a certain
matter and, with the general agreement of all the parties
involved, publishing the result, what we have called in-
formal standard-setters.
In section three, we introduced different standard-setting
organisations. These include (i) international intergovern-
mental standard-setting organisations, such as UNCIT-
RAL and the World Bank, (ii) other international stand-
ard-setting organisations, such as INSOL International
and the International Insolvency Institute, (iii) other re-
gional standard-setting organisations, such as INSOL
Europe and the European Law Institute, (iv) Dutch
standard-setting organisations, such as INSOLAD and
Recofa, and (v) several informal standard-setters. Increas-
ingly, regional standard-setting organisations and inform-
al standard-setters have become active in the area of re-
structuring and insolvency law, contributing to a process
of convergence of insolvency laws.
Subsequently, in section four, we elaborated on the soft
law instruments on two current topics: (i) cooperation
and communication in cross-border insolvency cases
between courts and insolvency practitioners, and (ii) re-
structuring of distressed businesses (besides liquidation)
and to guidance, on matters such as cross-border cooper-
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ation and communication. From this, we show that the
development of soft law instruments that deal with mat-
ters of restructuring and insolvency law is pursued glob-
ally.
In section five we discussed the various advantages and
disadvantages of using soft law instruments. We showed
that soft law instruments on restructuring and insolvency
law lead to less politicised compromises, provide for more
flexibility, and are developed more quickly and at lower
cost than hard law. Also, soft law instruments are very
suitable for developing ethical and professional standards
and their use does not diminish the sovereignty of states
and judges. On the other hand, soft law instruments may
be subject to serious problems of interpreting their pro-
visions, they may be hard to find and are non-binding or
non-enforceable. Also, soft law instruments usually do
not provide procedures for revision. They need to develop
their own due process for drafting. Furthermore, it may
take considerable time before the impact of soft law in-
struments becomes visible, and when they are used, they
may face matters of ‘incomplete contracts’, such as on
monitoring and conflict resolution.
The impact of soft law instruments is discussed in section
six. We discuss three ways in which – in the area of re-
structuring and insolvency - soft law instruments have
shown to be relevant. First, case law of the UK and USA
has made substantive reference to the Global Principles
(2012). Also, Dutch case law has made references to soft
law instruments from INSOLAD and Recofa. Second,
soft law instruments have also inspired legislators. We
have seen reference to soft law instruments in the legisla-
tive process in the UK, but most notable is the adoption
of the Model Law of UNCITRAL in some 48 jurisdic-
tions worldwide. Based on their soft law instruments,
UNCITRAL, as well as the World Bank, assist countries
in such legal reforms of insolvency frameworks. Third,
legislators have extended their hard law regimes by includ-
ing explicit references to soft law instruments. Within
Europe, the EIR 2015 provides for a reference to soft law
instruments on cooperation in cross-border insolvency
cases. Consider also the proposed Preventive Restructur-
ing Directive promoting the sharing of best practices in
the training of practitioners.
Based on this, we emphasise that soft law instruments
can have several roles with respect to hard law instru-
ments. They can (i) complement existing hard law, (ii) be
an alternative to hard law, or (iii) conflict with existing
hard law (or even soft law). Still, it must also be con-
sidered that despite their disadvantages, there has been a
significant increase in the number of soft law instruments
dealing with international restructuring and insolvency
law, more than fifty to date. The sheer number already
both signals the interest in soft law (by organisations and
by addressees, such as insolvency practitioners and
courts) and recognises their relevance.
Study of the full body of these soft law instruments is
complicated given the practical difficulties in finding them
and the further complexities in assessing their practical
impact and relevance. Therefore, we suggest two ques-
tions for further research, in particular addressed to (in-
solvency) practitioners and judges.101 First, what are their
experiences with regard to the advantages and disadvan-
tages of soft law instruments? Second, to what extent are
soft law instruments used, more specifically, to what ex-
tent is there awareness of the growing body of soft law
instruments, to what extent are they used in practice
and/or implemented? Responses to these questions will
certainly add practical and considerate arguments to a
better use of soft law instruments in this area. They will
support a better understanding of the development and
use of soft law instruments in international restructuring
and insolvency law.
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